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Abstract 
 
The question of minority treatment, and illiberal minority treatment in particular, is an often 
contended subject among political philosophers. As most Western liberal democracies are 
multicultural it seems that this topic will remain relevant for a long time to come. 
This thesis presents the arguments of both autonomy liberalism and toleration liberalism in 
respect to the treatment of illiberal cultures within a liberal democratic state. While the 
arguments for toleration-based approach to liberalism are acknowledged and discussed, I devote 
a significant portion of this work to the defence of personal autonomy as the fundamental value 
within liberalism, as well as a value necessary to be acknowledged even by illiberal immigrant 
groups residing within a liberal democracy. Literature on the subject by well-established political 
philosophers is often focused solely on examples relevant to the United States of America, 
Canada or United Kingdom. The scope of this thesis is aimed at cases and national minorities 
relevant to Western Europe. 
The limits to toleration of illiberal minorities, which I establish in chapter 3, are in large part 
influenced by my understanding of personal autonomy as the fundamental value of liberalism, as 
well as by my interpretation of Raz's perception of personal value in both liberal and illiberal 
states. 
The differentiation of national minorities relevant to Europe from those relevant to the American 
continent is the focus for selecting the guiding principles for the evaluation of self-government 
claims of said minorities, a topic to which the entire chapter 4 is devoted.  
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Introduction 
 
We currently live in a modern, multicultural, age characterized by constant struggles against 
racism and other forms of violations to our perceptions of equality. The challenges and costs of 
transportation have decreased significantly compared to what they were even a few decades ago, 
in main part due to the advancement in both public infrastructure and technology, and the 
economical advancements associated with them, as well as due to the willingness of the Western 
liberal world in accepting immigrant populations. The hindrances associated with migration have 
thus been significantly lowered by such advancements as well, making it only easier for 
individuals or small groups to emigrate to a new country with the possibility of starting a new 
and better life for themselves and their families. These migrants however often originate from 
illiberal cultures and as such often encounter problems when attempting to salvage certain 
aspects of their culture which clash with the conception of good life as envisioned by the 
contemporary Western liberal democracies. Liberal political philosophers are divided mainly 
into two groups: those who argue for autonomy-based liberalism, which takes personal 
autonomy as the fundamental liberal value, and those who argue for toleration-based liberalism, 
which takes toleration as the fundamental value within liberalism.  
With the Western liberal world becoming increasingly multinational, the topic of immigration 
remains one of the most discussed topics among both the public as well as among experts in the 
field of politology. The question of a liberal accommodation of illiberal minorities, or immigrant 
groups, is a question of toleration, inclusiveness and selective pluralism. The acknowledgement 
of value pluralism is as essential to liberalism as its other principles, but to consider all perceived 
values as reasonable or acceptable within domestic matters would be a utopian viewpoint. 
Migration is a matter of both cultural assimilation and cultural preservation, and as such 
immigrants tend to strive to both assimilate into the majority culture as much as they try to 
preserve their culture of origin for their future generations. The main problem arises when such 
organised groups prioritise their own principles, which oppose the traditional liberal values, over 
the principles upon which a Western democratic society is established. 
At the most general level, the question addressed here is: 'How should a liberal democratic 
state treat illiberal minorities?'  
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With the main question identified, several further questions need to be distinguished. First, there 
is the question of whether a liberal state should impose liberal norms on illiberal cultures or 
minorities; second, if such norms are to be imposed then what should be the limits to toleration 
of said cultures; and last, what should be the criteria for evaluating the claims of European 
national minorities to self-government rights.  
I will begin this thesis by conceptualising toleration and personal autonomy, as well as the two 
forms of liberalism to which they are central, with the remaining chapters being devoted to the 
conceptualisation of a liberal treatment of illiberal minorities residing within a liberal 
democracy. 
In the second chapter I will deal with the question of imposing liberal norms on illiberal 
minorities. Starting with this first question I will present a defence of autonomy-based liberalism, 
as well as provide arguments for why personal autonomy can be understood as a universal 
primary good even in the case of illiberal cultures residing within a liberal democratic state. In 
this chapter I will also introduce the differentiation of national minorities of Europe from those 
of the United States of America and Canada, a differentiation on which I will later expand in the 
fourth chapter. 
In the third chapter I will deal with the question of which guiding principles we should employ in 
establishing the limits to toleration within a liberal democracy. I will also argue that value 
pluralism needs to be embraced also by illiberal minorities, as long as they live within a liberal 
state. The main part of this chapter will consist of the evaluation of other political philosophers' 
guiding principles in establishing limits to toleration, as well as of my analysis of liberal limits to 
toleration of the illiberal. 
And finally in the fourth chapter I will discuss group-differentiated rights with a focus on the 
importance and dangers of self-government rights. While the second and third chapters deal with 
the problem of how minority rights should be limited by human, or individual, rights; the fourth 
chapter also deals with the topic of how minority rights co-exist with human rights. The main 
target of this chapter is, however, to establish guiding principles for the evaluation of minorities' 
claims to self-government rights, and to differentiate these principles from those relevant to the 
national minorities of the American continent. 
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Many thinkers have focused their work on the issues of the integration of illiberal groups within 
a liberal democracy, but I will restrict the scope of this thesis to political philosophers of the past 
century; with focus placed mainly on the works of Chandran Kukathas, Will Kymlicka, Bhikhu 
Parekh, John Rawls and Joseph Raz; as they represent the two main strands of liberal thought on 
the topic of illiberal minorities and the respective values of toleration and personal autonomy. 
Having established the topics that this thesis will deal with, it is perhaps a good idea to also 
establish with which it will not address. Unlike the authors whose work I have used for research 
of the topic I will not devote specific sections of this thesis to conceptualising culture, the debate 
between individualism and collectivism or to historical accounts of multicultural societies. My 
hope in this thesis is to provide a proposition for a liberal treatment of illiberal minorities within 
European liberal democracies, which could also be applicable in other Western liberal 
democracies. 
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Chapter 1: Conceptualising toleration and personal autonomy 
 
The following thesis will contain numerous references to the concepts of personal autonomy and 
toleration, as well as references to types of liberalism to which they are central. As both are 
capable of being interpreted in multiple ways it seems that to understand the topic itself one 
should begin with clarifying the conceptual definitions with which he will work. 
What does it mean to be tolerant? Kukathas defines toleration as an ''undemanding virtue'' which 
requires of an individual little more than indifference 
1
. Catriona McKinnon defines it as ''a 
matter of putting up with that which you oppose'' 
2
.  
The most important definition, however, is that by Michael Walzer, who distinguishes between 
two types of tolerance, tolerance as an attitude and toleration as a practice 
3
. A person may be 
tolerant in the sense of self-restraint, as was implied in the definitions of Kukathas and 
McKinnon, but  the type of toleration that this thesis is concerned with is toleration as a practice; 
and more specifically toleration of illiberal cultures by a liberal democratic state 
4
.  
Personal autonomy is the freedom to live one's own life. One, however, may not make his own 
decisions on every matter even within the liberal society, with the relationship between children 
and parents being a straightforward example 
5
. Raz describes personal autonomy as ''opposed to 
a life of coerced choices'' and as ''an ideal of self-creation'' 
6
. What Raz means to imply by the 
ideal of self-creation is that an individual who possesses personal autonomy has the ability to 
both make his own decisions, as well as revise them afterwards. 
                                                          
1
 Kukathas, C., Liberal Archipelago. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 23 
2
 McKinnon, C., Toleration: A Critical Introduction. (New York: Routledge, 2006), pp. 3 
3
 Walzer, M., On Toleration. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), pp. xi 
4
 Illiberal cultures are best described by Kymlicka as groups ''which do not value personal 
autonomy, and which restrict the ability of their own members to question and dissent from 
traditional practices'' (Kymlicka, 1995:154). 
5
 Raz, J., The Morality of Freedom. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), pp. 369 
6
 Raz, 1986: 370-371 
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Both the concepts of toleration as a practice, and of personal autonomy are central to the liberal 
doctrine. Liberalism is a political outlook centered on embracing human diversity 
7
, but the 
disputed question is whether embracing human diversity also encompasses the illiberal. I have 
also mentioned in the introduction that liberal political philosophers are divided on the topic of 
whether personal autonomy or tolerance is the fundamental value within liberal theory. Both of 
the values are essential to liberalism, but prioritising one of the two values affects how a political 
philosopher views inclusion of cultural groups which may not accept the liberal principles of 
equality and liberty. Liberalism isn't traditionally opposed to behaviour which does not 
negatively affect other people, but a culture's denial of its members' autonomy can both be seen 
as preventing them from dissent, as well as enabling the members in question to consider dissent 
for themselves; provided that the right to exit is guaranteed 
8
. One can therefore see how liberals 
can be divided on the subject, as even illiberal groups can potentially be understood as a valuable 
part of the 'human diversity'. Different philosophers may therefore interpret the aforementioned 
culture's treatment of its own members in two significantly different ways.  
Those who embrace autonomy-based liberalism are non-accepting of communities which deny 
their own members freedom of choice, while those who embrace toleration-based liberalism are 
more accepting of such behaviour 
9
. Philosophers who embrace toleration-based liberalism do 
not deny importance of personal autonomy, or the freedom of choice, but rather do not place it 
above the importance of the freedom of association 
10
. To quote Kukathas: ''(a)ll forms of 
liberalism accept that the good society is one that does not enforce upon everyone some 
particular ideal of the good life but allows different ways to flourish'' 
11
. The principle difference 
                                                          
7
 Kukathas, 2003: 2 
8
 Kukathas, 2003: 37 
9
 This outlook is best expressed by Kukathas who states that ''... larger associations may be 
characterized as liberal even if they contain smaller ones which may not. A liberal empire may 
contain illiberal societies; a liberal society may contain illiberal communities; a liberal 
community may contain numerous illiberal associations. ''  (Kukathas, 2003: 26). 
10
 Kukathas, 2003: 15 
11
 Kukathas, 2003: 16 
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between the two forms of liberalism mentioned is that the autonomy-based liberalism does not 
regard a culture's denial of personal autonomy as 'a (potential) way to flourish'.   
10 
 
Chapter 2: On the imposition of liberal norms towards illiberal cultures 
 
Perhaps the best way to begin evaluating the debate on the subject would be to further specify 
what I will be referring to by the term 'illiberal cultures'.  By the term illiberal cultures I will be 
referring to organised groups bound together by common history and beliefs, groups which 
demand group-differentiated rights in what they perceive to be internal matters relative to 
treatment of its own members; treatments which would be in direct conflict with the basic rights 
which guarantee citizens personal autonomy, among other civil rights. They may be religious 
groups which do not tolerate specific behaviour of its own members, such as for example 
apostasy; as much as they may also be groups not motivated by religion but rather by tradition 
and history, with deeply embedded cultural customs which are perceived to be in direct conflict 
with one's personal autonomy and both physical and emotional well-being, a rather obvious 
example being the practice of genital mutilation or arranged marriages of minors. 
In his book 'On Toleration' Walzer discusses this practice in length, noting specifically that ''the 
operations are also performed in African immigrant communities in Europe and North America.'' 
12
. One can thus see that such inherently illiberal practices are not only a predicament specific to 
the non-Western world, but are relevant to a Western democratic society as well. The topic of 
genital mutilation is often discussed by both political theorists and the general public, although 
the emphasis is often placed specifically on practices targeted at females, with circumcision of 
males being not only tolerated but also widely practiced and accepted in the Western world. I 
will however return to this topic later in the next chapter, where I discuss this practice's 
implications toward both the limits to toleration, as well as to liberalism in general.  
It would be misleading to assume that cultures can simply be divided into liberal and illiberal, as 
presently even many emerging liberal democracies encounter instances of illiberal behaviour, in 
addition to the historical accounts of illiberal behaviour perpetrated by the governments of 
already established Western democratic societies. Consider for example the restrictions on 
personal autonomy which were imposed on tens of thousands of American citizens with 
Japanese heritage during the second World War in the pacific regions of the United States of 
                                                          
12
 Walzer, 1997: 62 
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America. It was during this time period that the government has approved the creation of 
detention camps targeted at a specific minority and meant as a preventive measure, one of the 
more extreme instances of illiberal behaviour perpetrated by a liberal and democratic 
government. Many have also called the official ruling of Switzerland to ban further constructions 
of minarets illiberal due to it being seen as a violation to liberal toleration. As the concept of 
political liberal toleration is seen to have its roots in religious toleration itself, one can 
understand the logic of an individual seeing such ruling as illiberal. To quote Kymlicka ''the 
liberality of a culture is a matter of degree'' 
13
, and as such when discussing illiberal cultures 
within this thesis I will attempt to indicate the specific aspects of illiberality in question. For the 
purpose of this thesis I will however focus solely on illiberal practices of cultural minorities 
within the Western liberal democracies, which are often specific to religious communities, rather 
than instances of illiberal behaviour perpetrated by governments of liberal democracies 
themselves. 
By liberal norms I will be referring to the liberal principles of individual autonomy, toleration 
and social justice as guaranteed by civil, or liberal, rights which exist for the equal benefit of all 
members of the society. To quote McKinnon ''one of the requirements imposed on all its 
members by the liberal state is that (liberal) rights be respected'' 
14
. As liberal rights are specific 
to the Western world one may already see how such imposition by the state can be seen as 
problematic by illiberal cultures, and also political philosophers who have turned this fact into a 
critique on the imposition of liberal norms, a critique to which I will refer to at the beginning of 
section 2.3. 
The main question posed in this chapter is: How can one justify the imposition of liberal norms 
on illiberal cultures which refuse them?  I pose this question as it is often disputed whether we 
can prove that it is their conscience, and not ours, which is mistaken. I propose two methods to 
answering this question, with the first consisting of turning to Rawls' original position and the 
second of Raz's conception of personal autonomy.  
                                                          
13
 Kymlicka, 1995: 94 
14
 McKinnon, 2006: 103 
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2.1 The value of personal autonomy  
 
To quote Rawls, ''a person's conscience is misguided when he seeks to impose on us conditions 
that violate the principles to which we would each consent in that situation'' 
15
. If an individual 
guides his life by cultural norms, and in this case specifically by illiberal norms, then that 
individual is being subjective in the sense of seeing man as being built on historically-constituted 
truths, rather than a being with the potential to evolve. Man is, indeed, built on the knowledge 
and experiences of past generations, but to guide one's life by illiberal norms would require to 
deny new generations the capacity for revisability and for progress in general. I believe I share 
this specific view with Rawls, who states that ''to say that man is a historical being is to say that 
the realizations of the powers of human individuals living at any one time takes the cooperation 
of many generations'' 
16
. Rawls also supposes that in order to be truly objective, an individual 
would need to turn to the original position in order to obtain answers unclouded by culturally 
biased or self-serving moral reasoning.  
Therefore to decisively answer the main question posed in the previous paragraph one must then 
turn to the original position. The reason for why an illiberal individual would choose liberal 
principles in an original position is self-respect. Rawls establishes on multiple occasions that 
self-respect is the most important primary good. It is the most important primary good because it 
''implies a confidence in one's ability'' and his ''secure conviction that his conception of his good, 
his plan of life, is worth carrying out''. Rawls then continues his argument by stating that ''the 
parties in the original position would wish to avoid at almost any cost the social conditions that 
undermine self-respect'' 
17
. But it is precisely the illiberal principles upon which the illiberal 
cultures operate that deny these aspects of self-respect. For if a person isn't given the option to be 
autonomous and to make his own choices in life, then it is doubtful that the person would possess 
the aforementioned aspects of self-respect. Rawls describes an individual in the original position 
as being able to rank alternatives to his own ends, and that in general he ''must try to protect (his) 
liberties, widen (his) opportunities, and enlarge (his) means for promoting (his) aims whatever 
                                                          
15
 Rawls, J., A Theory of Justice. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 518 
16
 Rawls, 1971: 525 
17
 Rawls, 1971: 440 
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they are'' 
18
. Consider then that an individual in the original position would be informed that he 
does not have the capacity to revise his own ends, as that ability is to belong only to the leaders 
of his community. To expect an individual in the original position to accept such a proposition as 
truth would require him to deny himself self-respect, as he would have to simply accept that 
others have the ability to revise his own ends, instead of himself. It is because of this reason I 
believe it can be assumed that the imposement of liberal norms can be defended from the 
perspective of the original position, as a person in the original position would not accept the 
illiberal principles precisely due to the their implications to an individual's self-respect.  
The second method is related to Raz's adequate range of options. Personal autonomy is the 
counterpole to a life consisting of coerced choices, a life which may be typical for the most 
extreme cases of illiberal behaviour. According to Joseph Raz, for a person to be considered as 
truly autonomous, that person needs to be presented with an adequate range of options to choose 
from, a thesis to which I will return in chapter 3.3 when discussing limits to tolerance to the 
illiberal versions of segregation. Raz also discusses the value of autonomy by stating that the 
value differs between those who live in an autonomous society and are therefore forced to be 
autonomous, as otherwise they would be unable to prosper in their society; and those who choose 
to refuse it voluntarily, as they do not see it as the only valuable way of life 
19
. It is with this 
differentiation of value that I believe it is possible to establish the value of autonomy to illiberal 
minorities who choose to immigrate to a liberal democracy, for it proves that personal autonomy 
needs to be a required principle even of illiberal minorities as long as they reside within a liberal 
state. As Raz states, an autonomous individual residing within a society operating on the 
principles of liberalism has no choice but to be autonomous if he wishes to have a successful, or 
prosperous, life. An individual who belongs to an illiberal society outside the bounds of a liberal 
democratic state and who cannot be considered autonomous also has a potential to live a 
successful life within his own society, as it does not affect the general range of options available 
to that specific society. The change in this value however occurs when that illiberal culture 
chooses to reside within a liberal democratic state, as then his inability to be autonomous affects 
both his range of options as well as his chances at a prosperous life. Through becoming a part of 
                                                          
18
 Rawls, 1971: 143 
19
 Raz, 1986: 369-399 
14 
 
a larger society with more options, the individual's range of options decreases significantly and 
therefore becomes unable to be considered adequate 
20
. Even an illiberal type of a segregated 
community, a type which I expand upon in section 3.3, operates within the larger framework of 
the liberal state, and as such enforcing the liberal principle of personal autonomy seems to be the 
best choice. 
All ethnic communities however deserve special attention from the liberal democratic state due 
to the very nature of the democratic processes, as the decisions on legislative action need to be 
weighed on the differentiation between the two main claims for collective rights that a minority 
culture can make, those classified by Kymlicka as claims for internal restrictions, or for external 
protections. 
 
2.2 Internal restrictions and external protections 
 
The decision on whether to impose liberal norms on an illiberal practice needs to be carefully 
judged based on causes as well as effects of the practices in question. 
Kymlicka identifies two most essential kinds of claims that an immigrant group or a national 
minority might make: claims of internal restrictions and those of external protections. The claim 
for external protections ''is intended to protect the group from the impact of external decisions'' 
of the majority population. The claim for internal restrictions on the other hand is a claim for the 
restriction of the personal liberties of the minority's own members, and ''is intended to protect the 
                                                          
20
 This decrease is relative to other members of the liberal society, and it can be best explained 
by looking at Kukathas' example of a member of the Hutterite community attempting to leave his 
community. As the Hutterite community does not recognise the concept of private property, a 
member who attempts to leave would ''have to bear enormous costs in attempting to leave not 
only because of what he leaves behind but also because of the difficulties he will face in trying to 
move into a society for which his own community made unprepared'' (Kukathas, 2003: 108). In 
this sense the individual in question would feel a relative decrease in his range of options 
precisely due to the reason that he would now belong to a society in which the range of options 
available to others is significantly higher. 
15 
 
group from the destabilizing impact of internal dissent'' 
21
. Kymlicka uses this differentiation to 
signify that internal restrictions should be opposed by liberal thinkers, as they can be only used 
to impose restrictions on individuals' own inalienable liberal rights, while it should be allowed 
for external protections to exist in order to promote fairness among groups which may be 
underrepresented and possibly even oppressed. I agree with this differentiation, as external 
protection claims also encompass self-governance claims and special representation rights, to 
which I devote the bulk of chapter 4, and any other externally aimed legitimate claims that a 
minority can make.  
The main argument behind Kymlicka's differentiation of these two claims was however rejected 
by Gabriel Rauterberg, who argues that essentially both these categorisations refer to the same 
process, as ''most internal restrictions are really attempts at external restrictions'' 
22
, in the sense 
that they try to limit the influence of external groups. I however disagree with his refutation, as 
this specific viewpoint was addressed by Kymlicka himself, who stated that ''of course, all forms 
of government and all exercises of political authority involve restricting the liberty of those 
subject to the authority'' 
23
 
24
.  
Rauterberg also provides examples in which, he believes, internal restrictions can be justified. 
One of his examples is that permitting internal restrictions enables for creation of a moral 
environment, as moral values are subjective
25
, and this moral environment is needed in enabling 
                                                          
21
 Kymlicka, 1995: 35 
22
 Rauterberg, G., The Treatment of Isolationist Minorities. Yale Journal of Law & Humanities, 
Vol.22,  2010: 107 - 108 
23
 Kymlicka, 1995: 36 
24
 As it is, the differentiation does prove useful in separating the two main types of claims to 
authority that a minority may demand to be given. 
25
 They are subjective in the sense that different cultures adhere to different moral values. Even 
in the Western democratic world different nations debate differing moral values, such as for 
example the value of human life (as is the case with the debates on abortions or with the debates 
on death penalties). I will return to this topic in greater length in the next section when discussing 
what I refer to as the ''quantitative'' critique. 
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the flourishing of individuals, particularly children 
26
. The fact however remains that such 
flourishing, when dealing with internal restrictions of illiberal nature, is often guided by the 
society and as such cannot be considered to be guided by the individual himself. It is true that the 
liberal society enforces internal restrictions as well, best exemplified by the age of consent for 
sexual relations, and these restrictions are aimed at developing the moral character of the society. 
There is no doubt that internal restrictions exist even within liberal democratic states, as a certain 
degree of paternalism is seen as required 
27
, but such evaluations need to be made on the basis of 
individual cases, provided that they do not endanger the personal autonomy of a conscientious 
individual, as I will attempt to show in the following section. 
I will return to this topic in more detail, specifically on the criteria for the evaluation of specific 
internal restrictions in chapter 3, and specifically on external protections in chapter 4. For now 
the aim of this section was to establish that there are instances in which both internal restrictions 
and external protections should be granted, as well as that there are instances in which they 
should not. 
 
2.3 On the restriction of a community's right to autonomy 
 
Prior to section 2.1 I was referring to a critique of perceiving personal autonomy to be a 
universal human value, a critique to which I will be referring as quantitative on its basis of 
acknowledging a plurality of possible conceptions of  human values which may differ across the 
world, with the existence of this differing plurality proving that the value in question may not in 
fact be perceived as universal. Parekh argues for this point on the basis that as personal 
autonomy is perceived as a general human interest in the Western world but not in large parts of 
the rest of the world, it can hardly be deemed universal. This critique was voiced by Parekh as 
well as by Rawls. Kymlicka refers to Rawls' perception of personal autonomy by stating that ''the 
                                                          
26
 Rauterberg, 2010: 111 
27
 Consider for example the compulsory education system. State decides on the general 
guidelines for which specific knowledge needs to be taught to students in order to live a 
successful life. 
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problem, Rawls says, is that not everyone accepts this ideal of autonomy, and so appealing to it 
in political life would be 'sectarian' '' 
(28)
. Parekh appealed to the quantitative critique on an 
international scale, accounting for illiberal cultures worldwide as a reason enough not to perceive 
autonomy to be a universal human value, arguing that such an absolutisation of a human value 
instead needs to account for a conformable multitude of opinions. He states that ''the more 
satisfactory way to arrive at them (universal human values) is through a universal or cross-
cultural dialogue'' 
(29)
, which he believes has the potential to prevent self-serving moral reasoning 
of authoritative agents due to the public nature of the discourse on the matter. 
I believe that Parekh's arguments hold a certain merit relative to treatment of illiberal cultures 
within the domestic matters of a liberal democratic state. The idea of a cross-cultural dialogue as 
an aid to facilitating self-reform of an illiberal culture is defensible, although it depends largely 
on a non-segregational nature of the community in question. He however acknowledges this fact 
as well, stating that there is no 'foolproof' method of preventing instances of self-serving moral 
reasoning besides relying on the community's representatives to publicly justify their actions. 
There certainly are individuals who do not seek personal autonomy, individuals who would be 
glad to trade personal autonomy for a guarantee of whatever type of safety they seek. And as 
immigrant cultures tend to settle in close proximities to their own culture, segregational 
behaviour does have a potential to prevent cross-cultural dialogues. 
Parekh devotes entire sections of his book 'Rethinking Multiculturalism' to critique of individual 
political philosophers who advocate liberalisation of  illiberal cultures and ways of life. While 
recognising that in the most extreme cases certain aspects of liberalisation can be required, the 
only specific cases which he cites are cultural activities which result in a great physical or 
emotional harm, such as for example the most physically harmful type of female genital 
mutilation. He argues that in the works of contemporary political philosophers there are no 
principles with which it would be possible to arrive at infallible intercultural evaluation, a 
statement to which I will return in the next chapter.  
                                                          
28
 Kymlicka, 1995: 163 - 164. Also see Kukathas, 2003: 3, who interpreted Rawls' position on 
this matter in the same context. 
29
 Parekh, B., Rethinking Multiculturalism. (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2002), pp. 
128 
18 
 
The need for the imposition of liberal norms towards illiberal cultures has also been echoed by 
Kymlicka, who states that national minorities can ''maintain themselves as culturally distinct 
societies, but only if, and in so far as, they are themselves governed by liberal principles'' 
30
. As 
potentially illiberal minorities are dependent on collective autonomy, they should be required to 
be internally liberal as well. This point is also shared by Rawls, who states that ''an intolerant sect 
has no title to complain when it is denied an equal liberty'' 
31
. With this statement Rawls was 
referring to the fact that if a specific cultural group, in this specific case a religious group, aims at 
restricting the freedom of its members then it simply cannot complain of the state acting towards 
it in the same manner. The group in question has arrived knowingly, and most importantly 
voluntarily, in a liberal democratic society and as such needs to adjust its behaviour in a suitable 
manner, namely respecting personal autonomy of its members as long as it wishes to retain its 
own autonomy as well 
32
.  
A different perspective on the subject is presented by Parekh who, as an endorser of dialogically 
constituted multicultural societies, warns of a potential negative of this approach. Parekh 
specifies his opinion on the topic as following: ''In exceptional cases ... we might wonder if we 
should continue to respect its (illiberal culture's) right to autonomy. However, no cultural 
community is devoid of reformist resources, its constitutive beliefs and practices are best 
changed from within, and the outsider is unlikely fully to understand its complexity'' 
33
. Parekh 
acknowledges that any multicultural society is bound to include communities the practices of 
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which offend, or even outrage, the moral values of the majority population. After all, a large 
share of the recognised countries in the world is illiberal. Although Parekh does not advocate 
absolute tolerance of illiberal behaviour and practices, he believes that every community has a 
potential for reforming from within through interactions with other cultures. For him no culture 
can be considered ''wholly worthless, for then it is unlikely to command the allegiance of its 
members and last long'' 
34
. Allowance for time is a noticeable pattern in Parekh's work. His 
arguments largely rely on significantly long periods of time in order to take effect, a fact which 
he justifies by stating that the Western societies have taken the last two millennia to deal with the 
challenges of which they now accuse illiberal cultures, and that ''if Western societies can reform 
themselves without external assistance, there is no reason to assume that the rest of humankind 
cannot, unless it is supposed to consist of a less gifted species'' 
35
. Despite the fact that Parekh 
provides a resonant argument, it should be noted that his comparison of the two millennia would 
imply that the non-Western world didn't exist for the exact same duration of time as the Western 
world did. There is no doubt that self-criticism is a virtue seldom embraced, but in the case of 
immigrant cultures a liberal democratic state should be able to intervene if individual rights are 
being denied to members of illiberal communities, as well as in the cases of certain illiberal 
practices, as I will attempt to show now. 
 
2.4 The differentiation of illiberal national minorities and immigrant groups by the 
liberal state in Western Europe 
 
When dealing with the topic of illiberal minorities it is important to keep in mind that in a large 
majority of cases they are immigrant groups. Kymlicka defines immigrant groups as ''groups 
formed by the decision of individuals and families to leave their original homeland and emigrate 
to another society'' 
36
. I chose to use this definition to emphasize the use of the word 'decision' by 
Kymlicka. The decision to emigrate, and specifically the decision on the target country to 
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emigrate to, is crucial in establishing how Western liberal democracies should act towards 
illiberal immigrant groups, as I will explain in the concluding paragraph of this section. 
It needs to be acknowledged that it is not only immigrants that make up illiberal groups, but also 
national minorities which may predate the liberal state in which they reside 
37
. However, in my 
thesis I am focusing on Western Europe, which coincidentally lacks such clear examples of 
national illiberal minorities. In the case of Western Europe illiberal minorities and communities 
have established their residence through immigration. The only national minority which can 
perhaps be considered illiberal and which predates the liberal states is the Romani national 
minority. 
The Romani national minority, which is common in both Western and Eastern Europe, may be 
considered to be illiberal by some people, but I will not classify it as such. Due to their 
segregational tendencies, common arranged child marriages and tribal leadership some may 
consider them illiberal in the same sense as a traditional Indian or an orthodox immigrant 
community could be considered illiberal in the American or Canadian society. I perceive these 
segregational tendencies to be 'natural', rather than illiberal, in the sense of rather being the result 
of contemporary (and historical) intolerance, socio-economical factors and general tensions 
between the minority and the majority; rather than through limitations of personal autonomy by 
the leaders of the community or through the segregation being a tradition in itself 
38
. There are of 
course types of segregation that a liberal democratic state should act against and that should be 
considered illiberal, but I will return to this topic in the next section.  
There are many recorded, and presumably an even more significant number of unrecorded, cases 
of arranged child marriages within the Romani community. This behaviour can be rightly called 
illiberal, as the age of children has been reported as low as 4 at the time when their parents 
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agreed on the arranged marriage, and as low as 12 when the marriage ceremony was actually 
carried out . The tradition itself is however common only to the Romani communities originating 
in and from Eastern European countries. The Romani minority is widely present in the Western 
world, with the United States of America and Canada included, but the illiberal traditions for 
which it is infamous are native to the regions of Eastern Europe, in which the Romani minorities 
are largely unregulated by their respective governments 
39
.  
I have also previously referred to tribal leadership of this minority. I call it tribal in reference to 
the selection of the so called ''Gypsy King'' who is selected by the members of the entire 
community 
40
. This leader then has the authority to decide on matters to which two or more 
parties can't reach an agreement on, and also functions as the official representative in matters 
between the community and the majority population. As this leader is selected voluntarily the 
practice itself cannot be called illiberal. 
For these reasons I do not believe that the evaluation of illiberal practices of this national 
minority, deemed as traditions by the culture from which they originate, should differentiate 
from the evaluation of illiberal practices of immigrant groups in Western Europe; even though 
this national minority predates the European liberal states. Additionally the Amish national 
minority located in the United States of America, unlike the illiberal branches of the Romani 
community, strives for a full segregation with the aim of selecting specific roles for its own 
members. Its differentiation from illiberal immigrant groups rests on the fact that they do not 
hope to integrate in whatever degree to co-exist with the liberal cultures surrounding them. The 
Romani national minority differs from this behaviour in its wish to be only partially segregated 
and the fact that it does not create specific roles or jobs within their communities with the 
intention of making the community self-sufficient in terms of production. The illiberal traditions 
characteristic for the minority are native only to its branches native to Eastern Europe, and as 
such the instances in which such illiberal traditions make their appearance in the west should be 
considered on the same merit as those of immigrant groups.  
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I have mentioned before that 'decision' is crucial to the understanding of immigrant groups. The 
immigrant groups made the willing decision to abandon their countries and cultures of origin in 
order to pursuit a better life in a new culture. There were specific factors which attracted them 
enough to consider settling in a country whose moral values may differ, a fact which is publicly 
admitted. The question then becomes whether it is reasonable to ask illiberal immigrants to 
abandon specific parts of their culture based on the fact that their emigration was voluntary. My 
answer to this question is yes, as the emigration was motivated by considerably selfish reasons. 
The individuals chose the target country based on the prospect of a better life for themselves and 
their families, whether for financial reasons or in search of religious tolerance. It seems 
improbable that if the situation was reversed and a liberal individual would emigrate to an 
illiberal country that he would not have to adjust to the local traditions and moral values. It also 
seems improbable that  he would be able to practice liberal values such as freedom of speech in a 
country where freedom of speech isn't customary. It then only follows naturally that if an 
illiberal immigrant plans on relocating to a new culture which endorses liberal values he should 
expect to adjust to them instead of the other way around.  
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Chapter 3. On limiting toleration of illiberal practices 
 
Until now I have discussed the importance of liberal principles with a specific focus on personal 
autonomy. I have however not discussed the principle of toleration itself, and more specifically 
the limits to it and the criteria upon which such limits should be established. 
Toleration is a liberal principle which has been in the midst of liberal academic discussion since 
at least John Locke's 'Letters on toleration', with its roots in the basic form of religious tolerance 
and with its original aim established as separating the church and the state, with the intent of 
promoting value plurality. A liberal democracy's most basic commitments may be to liberty and 
equality, but toleration is as important aspect of a liberal democracy as any. Closely tied to 
equality through recognition of value pluralism, it is often argued among political philosophers 
whether personal autonomy or tolerance is the most essential liberal value within liberalism, with 
autonomy emphasized by writers such as Kymlicka and toleration by writers such as Kukathas. It 
is however impossible to attribute the same importance to both values due to the tension which 
exists between the two, and even more so when it comes to the subject of illiberal groups within 
a liberal democratic state. For where does toleration of clashing values of a community end? As I 
have pointed out before there are political philosophers who argue that since not all cultures 
attribute value to the concept of personal autonomy, it can hardly be regarded as a universal 
value. The tension that exists between these two concepts then is a tension of priority. 
One may therefore ask why I do not believe that toleration should be considered as the 
fundamental value, in place of personal autonomy. In everyday's practice toleration implies self-
restraint. We may not like the way of life and practices of another person but we tolerate them, as 
to do otherwise would be to engage in moral monism. The case of tolerating illiberal traditions 
poses a further risk, that to which Kukathas refers to as paternalistic toleration, in which the 
majority tolerates a practice of an illiberal group to the extent that it doesn't recognize the 
practice seriously, thus not allowing the different groups to reconcile the ideal shared value. 
Toleration is a necessity in sustaining both diversity and equality, mainly among religious 
communities, but it also presents a risk. Toleration implies recognition of value, and as such 
groups which are tolerated may see it acceptance or approval of their own practices, despite their 
potential conflicts with majority's moral values, as well as the objectivity of the moral value 
24 
 
itself. The notion of this inherent problem of toleration is also shared by Walzer, who states that 
toleration ''is not a formula for harmony: it legitimates previously repressed or invisible groups 
and so enables them to compete for available resources'' 
41
. Such an understanding of toleration 
then may lead to further complications, as it prevents possible reconciliation of differences 
between the different perceived moral values, for even if a practice is tolerated, such as the 
example of male circumcision on which I will expand in section 3.2, it should not mean that it is 
irrevisable. Both Kukathas and Parekh refer to this effect of toleration in their respective works. 
42
. For some groups, or practices, toleration may imply self-restraint, while for some it may 
imply its exact opposite. 
43
 I argue that the existence of history and tradition should not be 
deemed as a condition for irrevisability, as toleration of certain illiberal practices may give their 
respective groups of origin specifically that idea, and for that reason not every conceivable 
difference or practice should be tolerated. By this statement I do not mean to imply that 
communities and cultures do not have the right to self-preservation, with that right also extended 
to their practices through which they define themselves, as long as such self-preservation does 
not violate the principles which I will list in this chapter. 
In the previous chapter I have quoted Rawls' statement that in order to be tolerated, illiberal sects 
within a liberal state need to be capable of toleration as well, although along the lines of 
recognising autonomy. But should illiberal minorities be capable of acknowledging the 
revisability of values if their values are to be encompassed within that plurality as well? William 
Galston states that ''Pluralist deliberation must be open to the possibility that even the most 
deeply entrenched principles of conduct may have to be revised or set aside in unusual 
circumstances'' 
44
. Political philosophers, such as Parekh, defend toleration of the intolerant on 
the grounds that their values also belong to those of the collective plurality of values. An illiberal 
                                                          
41
 Walzer, 1997: 107 
42
 For their full explanation see Kukathas, 2003: 32; and Parekh, 2002: 1. 
43
 By ''the exact opposite'' I am referring to the indirect empowerment of a group through the 
toleration of their practices which I have described on the previous page. The empowerment in 
perceiving the toleration of a practice to be the basis for its continuous existence. 
44
 Galston, W. A., Liberal Pluralism: The Implications of Value Pluralism for Political Theory 
and Practice. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 89. 
25 
 
group may openly express its sentiments, as such expression is protected by the right to free 
speech, but this fact changes when words turn to actions 
45
. Unrestricted tolerance is a matter of a 
utopian state 
46
, but not a matter of rising multicultural states in which differences must be 
acknowledged and compromised between the different parties. 
The acknowledgement of value pluralism is as essential to liberalism as toleration is. It could be 
even argued that value pluralism is tolerance in itself 
47
, as through acknowledging the pluralism 
of values we acknowledge the existence of multiple valuable options to life of which we are 
either not aware or by which we do not live. It is the recognition that there is no single ideal way 
of life, and no single lone virtue to live by. Value pluralism is also the prime reason for why 
political philosophers attempt to find ways in which illiberal cultures could be accepted into the 
mainstream liberal society, though there are occasions in which it is possible to deal with 
absolutes. It is doubtful for example, that there are any liberal thinkers for whom it would seem 
possible to defend slavery as a valuable lifestyle, as it is perceived as a settled question by its 
very nature 
48
. There are of course individuals who could see slavery as a desirable life style, but 
the existence of a small quantity of exceptions does not prove the rule wrong. As such, limits to 
toleration therefore need to be established in order to ensure that individuals may revise the 
traditions and practices of the community to which they belong. 
The same, however, cannot be said for international affairs. In the case of international politics 
the common practice of liberal democratic countries is to endorse toleration over enforcing 
autonomy, a statement which was also echoed by Kukathas who compared 'international society' 
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to toleration-based liberalism 
49
. In the previous chapter I have presented a defence of autonomy-
based liberalism in terms of domestic affairs, I however do not propose that this form of 
liberalism should also be applied to international politics. There are of course political 
philosophers who argue that we should focus on extending liberal doctrine even to illiberal 
countries abroad, with Kymlicka being a prominent example in the sense of promoting liberal 
principles in cases of cultures which choose to impose severe internal restrictions and violence 
on its very own members, but this difference in opinion is traditionally decided based on the 
individual thinker's conviction of the most fundamental liberal value. However, due to failures of 
such internationally oriented liberalisation attempts over the past decades the toleration-based 
liberalism should not be extended forcefully to the 'international society'. The failures in question 
were results of expecting illiberal cultures and their respective institutions to spontaneously 
convert to liberalism at a whim with the society, and most importantly its institutions, not 
prepared for such a drastic change of lifestyle. The conditions for the liberalisation of illiberal 
minorities within a liberal state however do not present such difficulties, mainly due to its 
institutions operating on principles of liberalism, as well as the exposure of a formerly 
segregated communities to liberal culture on an everyday basis. The approach toward 
liberalisation in domestic affairs is also different due to Raz's argument which I have mentioned 
in the previous chapter, the argument on the necessity of personal autonomy towards leading a 
successful life within a state that operates on the liberal principles. 
 
3.1 The different criteria for establishing the limits to toleration 
 
In spite of Rawls' commitment to neutrality (for what is the original position if not the position of 
neutrality), he names what he perceives to be a single instance in which the intolerant shouldn't 
be tolerated in his book 'A Theory of Justice', and that is in the cases when ''the tolerant sincerely 
and with reason believe that their own security and that of the institutions of liberty are in 
danger'' 
50
. I believe that it is therefore safe to assume that Rawls' limits to toleration are 
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established at only the most extreme hypothetical endangerments to the actual institutions, rather 
than to members of the community itself. To recognise a threat to not only the people's security 
but also to the security of the institutions of the state would require the tolerant in question to 
organise in decisive numbers in a behaviour supportive of the movement's cause. Such 
gatherings with a common consensus on an issue are however less prone to occur when they 
affect a specific group of people rather than the institutions themselves. Consider for example the 
case of the African-American Civil Rights Movement in the United States of America which, 
while gaining wide public acceptance and being a large movement, was still opposed by large 
numbers of the country's population in southern states, such as for example in the state of 
Alabama.
51
 
In the previous chapter I have also referred to Parekh's statement on principles related to 
intercultural evaluation, or the criteria for limiting toleration in a multicultural society. This 
specific thesis is among the main reasons for which he has named his book 'Rethinking 
Multiculturalism'. Parekh identifies 4 main guiding principles which he believes summarize the 
different means through which much of the popular and philosophical discourse tries to establish 
limits to toleration of illiberal cultures. The four principles are: the principle of universal human 
rights, the principle of shared core values, the no-harm principle and the principle of dialogical 
consensus 
52
. I have already discussed the general views on the principle of universal human 
rights and shared core values in the previous chapter. Some thinkers argue that there are specific 
core values or rights which can be established universally, while some have provided a critique 
of this viewpoint. The no-harm principle is also largely self-explanatory in that it establishes 
physical harm as being beyond reasonable toleration. Its obvious limitation is that it cannot be 
applied to certain specific illiberal practices which do not cause such harm, such as arranged 
marriages of minors or even polygamy and other gender inequalities. Lastly there is the principle 
of dialogical consensus, the endorsers of which believe in the ability of different cultures to find 
a common ground on the positions to which they have previously disagreed upon. 
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An endorser of this principle is Kukathas, which together with the no-harm principle roughly 
establish his limits to tolerance. Kukathas' liberal theory of illiberal minorities accounts for his 
metaphor of a 'liberal archipelago'. With this metaphor  Kukathas is appealing directly to the 
principle of dialogical consensus, to a multicultural ideal of a liberal society encompassing also 
illiberal cultures who have a voluntary choice of which specific community they would like to 
belong to, with only the most essential instances of liberalisation required. The most essential 
instances are the provision of a right to exit, and the provision of right to information about other 
cultures, with the right to information being synonymous with the principle of dialogical 
consensus.
53
 As individuals from any culture would be able to exchange information with 
individuals from other cultures with the aim of deciding on an ideal community to belong to, 
their communities of origin would be in turn influenced in a passive way with their departure, 
potentially starting dialogues within the community itself. 
I have mentioned that Parekh criticised the practice of perceiving a single one principle from all 
of the aforementioned principles as the fundamental principle for evaluating limits to toleration, 
as they are all susceptible to critique and as such no single principle can be used by itself in order 
to evaluate intercultural traditions. His criteria to establishing the limits to toleration were 
however also based specifically on the principle of dialogical consensus. While he argued that 
moral values cannot be defended objectively by debating, he did state that ''it might then be 
better to postpone the decision on the disputed practice in the hope that the passage of time and 
the fusion of ideas brought about by formal and informal public discussions will create enough 
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common ground and willingness to facilitate a consensus or at least a negotiated compromise in 
the future'' 
54
.  
I also do not believe that any of Parekh's listed principles is sufficient enough in itself to 
guarantee objective limits to tolerance. However, in combination with each other, and with 
certain new additions, they might be able to create legitimate criteria towards the evaluation of 
said limits. 
3.2 The no-harm principle 
 
The harm that I will be referring to in this section is of physical nature. Although there are 
examples which I will mention which do have a potential to result also in mental or emotional 
harm, such harm occurs as a result of the prior physical harm. 
It is my belief that the no-harm principle should be a part of any thinker's conceptualisation of 
the limits to tolerance, although it needs to be further specified. Many thinkers have pondered 
whether there should be a differentiation between permanent and temporary types of harm, as 
well as a differentiation between different severities of harm. I will try to explain my stance on 
the no-harm principle with the following example. I have previously mentioned that male 
circumcision is a widely tolerated practice in the Western world, with above 50% males 
currently circumcised in the United States of America and 30% of the male population above the 
age of 15 circumcised globally, according to the World Health Organisation. It is true that this 
trend has been on the decrease over the past decades, but it still remains acceptable for parents, 
or guardians, to decide for their child whether to permanently remove a part of his body. Unlike 
female genital mutilation, its male equivalent does not have a specific potential to leave 
individuals with permanent negative health effects and life-lasting physical and psychological 
trauma. It does however cause irreparable damage to one's body with arguably no health benefits 
to legitimise it. There are instances in the life of an individual without circumcision in which he 
may need it, but such rare instances do not occur until that individual reaches a reasonable age, 
an age in which he has the ability to make this decision for himself. 
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It is also however a part of the traditions of multiple religions, with each of these traditions 
requiring the procedure to be performed on a child of such age that it cannot voice its own 
informed opinion on the subject. It is of no doubt that these religions would protest against what 
they would perceive to be an attack on their culture. I however do not propose that this practice 
be forbidden, but rather as a compromise postponed until an individual would reach an agreed 
upon age, at least in the case of male circumcisions. This adjustment of the practice would be a 
compromise as it would not disallow religious groups from practicing their rituals, but would 
instead simply place additional criteria on the ritual's performance. 
There are certain risks that such a decision could cause. As the practice is considered a rite of 
passage among the Jewish and Muslim cultures. McKinnon has also criticised the potential 
prohibition of male circumcision on children on the basis that singling out this procedure would 
treat ''religious parents unfairly by denying to them rights over their children that are no denied 
to non-religious parents who, for example, wish to have their babies' ears pierced'' 
55
. I however 
do not believe that this critique can be applied to my reasoning of a permanent removal of a body 
part, as in the case of ear piercing the case is completely different. Pierced ears have the potential 
to recover, in the sense that the ear can fully recover from such damage. Removed foreskin 
however does not grow back, and as such I do not believe that these two practices are 
comparable, even though the physical harm caused by both is only temporary. The only problem 
which I foresee with such a restriction imposed on this cultural practice is that religious groups 
could argue that it would postpone the 'rite of passage', thereby effectively prolonging the 
process of children becoming adults. Liberal states however already do that, by imposing age 
restrictions on both legal marriage as well as age for sexual consent. As my solution does not 
consider prohibiting the practice, but rather simply postponing it for an individual's own 
consideration, I do not believe it can be deemed unjustified.  
The case of female circumcision is largely different from its male equivalent, but yet I propose 
for it to be viewed through the same guiding principle. The harm resulting from it is permanent 
as opposed to temporary, and may be as much psychological as physical. Its main defendants 
base their arguments against its prohibition on the fact that there are multiple possible types of 
female circumcision with differing levels of harm, and as such it should be rather regulated than 
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prohibited, even more so since other voluntary augmentations of one's body are allowed within 
liberal democracies. Both McKinnon and Parekh name examples of women which have 
undergone such a procedure voluntarily, with the women supposedly arguing that besides the 
tradition being seen as a rite of passage, it is also a means of ''reminding themselves that from 
now onwards they were primarily mothers rather than wives whose maternal duties took 
precedence over personal pleasure'' 
56
.  
Prohibiting the option of having such a procedure done altogether would however equal to 
prohibiting procedures such as breast implants, change of gender, or tattooing, as they all are 
oriented towards changing the perception of one's attractiveness toward the opposite sex as well 
as being seen as a method of personal empowerment. The procedure of female circumcision 
could be means to a maternal empowerment through abandoning one's sexual identity with the 
aim of pursuing a virtue seen as more important in life, the virtue of non-sexual motherhood. 
Even though such a practice effectively disables a person's sexual drive, should it not be seen as 
a valuable option of life? I do realize that the more severe versions of female circumcision 
effectively disable a specific function of a human body, but isn't that the same effect that for 
example a transgender operation has? In the case of transgender operations humans also lose a 
specific physical ability, the ability for their sexual organs to function as well as the ability to 
reproduce, in order to pursue a life they deem as ideal, an operation that I believe to have effects 
comparable to that which removes a person's ability to experience sexual pleasure. 
The guiding principle in this case should then be identical to that of male circumcision, and rely 
on a conscientious decision guaranteed by an agreed upon age. There will always be a possibility 
that the decision to undergo such a procedure was made under social pressure, but the only 
protection from the side of state should be upheld in the case of individuals who are not capable 
of making an autonomous decision, children. I perceive that the only solution for eradicating 
social pressure from affecting adults would be through open access to information about the 
practice itself, as well as its consequences, in the same way that such discussion can prevent 
social pressure in other aforementioned practices involving non-reversible alterations of one's 
body. 
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This guiding principle, I believe, can be applied to all traditions and practices which result in 
physical harm. As long as there are individuals who autonomously seek such practices at a 
conscientious age, these practices should be allowed due to aforementioned reasons. But what 
about practices which cause even greater harm, the harm of death? Consider the following 
example. There is a tradition in India of widows burning themselves on their husband's funeral 
pyre. Should such an illiberal
57
 practice be allowed even within a liberal society? All things 
considered, such a decision to end one's own life due to tradition embedded in gender inequality 
is likely to be motivated by social pressure rather than true willingness of the individual. This 
specific practice for example only applies to females, as husbands do not traditionally burn 
themselves when their wives die. Should it then be disallowed on the principle of gender 
inequality or rather on the fact that a person shouldn't be able to take his or hers own life? For 
one thing there are liberal democracies, such as Belgium, the Netherlands or Switzerland, in 
which euthanasia is legal. Banning a cultural tradition on the grounds that a person shouldn't be 
able to take his life would therefore seem to be a conflicting statement. The case of euthanasia 
differs in this respect, however, due to it being legal only in cases of irrecoverable illnesses, as a 
method of mercy killing. Besides this difference there are two more reasons for which such a 
tradition shouldn't be permitted in a liberal society. The first reason is that this tradition takes 
place following a tragic event, a loss of a person close to the individual in question, at a time of 
distress during which individuals are known not to act rationally. The second reason is that this 
tradition reinforces gender inequality, the value of which I will discuss in the following section. 
3.3 Evaluating illiberal traditions which do not cause physical harm 
 
I believe I have now established the limits to toleration of practices involving non-temporary 
physical harm. There are however still many illiberal practices and traditions which do not cause 
physical harm themselves. How should a liberal democratic state act against practices such as 
forced segregation, or gender inequality? 
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In the previous chapter I have presented Raz's viewpoint on the value of autonomy and the need 
for an adequate range of options. In the case of highly segregated communities, a larger than 
significant portion of these options is removed from an individual. Consider an example of a 
female individual belonging to an orthodox community, forced to conceal her identity from other 
people through both looks and behaviour. In a community in which gender equality does not 
apply, and where each of her life decisions needs to be in acceptance with the highly demanding 
moral perfection, or at least what is seen as such, she has only two options available to her. She 
can either live according to those expectations, or leave the community. But can this range of 
options be considered adequate? For Kukathas it probably would be 
58
, as she has the right to exit 
as well as to information about cultures other than hers, but in view of Raz's description of 
personal autonomy she would not. 
Raz also states that ''it is intolerable that we should have no influence over the choice of our 
occupation  or ... not be able to decide on trivia such as when to wash or when to comb our hair'' 
59
. While an interesting proposition, does it also imply that it is intolerable if a person follows 
such religious traditions as Ramadan, or other religious types of fasting, during which a person 
cannot decide when to eat or when to pray? I don't believe that that is the case, as the person has 
the autonomous decision to follow the specific tradition in the first place, therefore effectively 
adding to the range of options available to that individual, but only if such a decision couldn't 
lead to ostracism by his community. The same principle can be applied to the controversial case 
of the requirement of wearing head scarves. I do not see ostracism, although it is currently 
tolerated, as a valuable option as the people whom it affects were raised in a society in which 
family and community values are much more stressed than in liberal societies, which emphasise 
the values of individualism. Therefore forcing such an individual to abandon his community on 
the grounds of not recognising  value pluralism cannot be seen as a valuable option. 
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Both Kukathas and Kymlicka present arguments for toleration of segregational behaviour. In 
order to legitimise segregation they present the examples of the Hutterite and Amish 
communities. These examples are however applicable only to the American continent, as their 
aim of segregation completely differs from the one I discuss here. In the case of the Amish and 
of the Hutterites the aim of the segregation is to create a self-sufficient community, with each of 
its members assigned a profession-oriented position within the society which does not depend on 
constant interaction with their surrounding liberal population 
60
 
61
. The case of segregation which 
I discuss here is relevant to Western Europe, one which does not strive for full segregation from 
the majority population, unlike the Amish and Hutterites minorities specific to the American 
continent which were granted exemptions from integration. The segregation applicable to 
Western Europe is of a partial nature, in the sense that the members of the segregated community 
are in everyday interaction with the majority population, with the community's members finding 
employment within the majority liberal society 
62
. For these reasons I argue that segregation 
should only be tolerated if the right to personal autonomy is guaranteed, together with the 
communities in question endorsing value pluralism as a means of protection from ostracism. The 
problem with this approach however is, that the state can hardly prevent and control matters 
related to ostracism if the community itself insists on it. In this case the best scenario that can be 
hoped for is that the community will be able to reach such an understanding  through dialogical 
consensus and awareness of value plurality, as is the case for example with Muslim communities 
and consumption of alcohol, or other activities prohibited by the Koran. 
In the previous section I also raised the question of the objectivity of sexual equality. There are 
illiberal practices, as the example of a widow I have raised beforehand, which deny objective 
value to sexual equality. Equality of sexes wasn't always acknowledged by liberalism, although 
arguably that may have been also due to practical reasons in addition to historical prejudice, as 
suggested by Jonathan Wolff in his evaluation of Jean-Jacques Rousseau's views on equality in 
liberalism 
63
.  But can it be perceived as objective solely in the view of last century's social 
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movements? The only possible way, without appealing to the original position of Rawls, is to 
look at the specific arguments that cultures which deny such objectivity could provide in their 
own defence. The best example to analyse would be that of the Muslim defence of polygyny, 
which was (I believe) successfully refuted by Parekh 
64
. Parekh noted that the main defence of 
this practice within the Muslim culture is claimed to be in its interpretation of their holy 
scripture, the Koran, and therefore the only way to claim gender equality as an objective 
universal value would be to refute their own arguments for its dismissal. He lists 5 of the most 
stressed arguments for polygyny, with the main arguments being that polygyny is sanctioned by 
the Koran and that it prevents the husband from either infidelity or divorce. As Parekh notes, 
polygyny is merely allowed by Koran but not required, and even its allowance is conditioned on 
equal treatment of all the wives, as well as the marriages being motivated not by passion, but 
rather by compassion. The decisive refutation is that ''the fact that the Koran permits it is at best 
a reason but not a conclusive reason for allowing it'', as the Koran forbids many other practices 
which Muslims choose to ignore, such as accumulation of wealth or consumption of alcohol.
65
 
Such an interpretation of a practice sanctioned by holy scripture as an irrevisable tradition could , 
however, be compared to a Christian claiming slavery to be acceptable based on the fact that it 
was sanctioned by the Bible. Historical context should not be perceived as the sole acceptable 
ground for legitimising practices, which then continue to be viewed as irrevisable. As for the 
claims of preventing infidelity or divorce, they can be considered highly subjective. Marital 
infidelity refers to extramarital relations, so their argument has a certain merit in linguistics, 
although not in practicality. The husband may not be cheating on his wife with a woman he isn't 
married to, but he still chooses to spend time in a perceivably private manner with another 
woman, and thus it is doubtful that such dynamics of polygyny could adhere to its supposed 
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allowance by the Koran conditioned on equal treatment and unmotivated by passion. I therefore 
believe that gender equality can be perceived as an objective universal value, and as such limits 
to toleration should be applied to practices which reinforce gender inequality. 
The limits to toleration should then be established by adhering to the following 4 guiding 
principles explained in this chapter. Practices which involve physical harm with the effect of 
irreversible procedures should not be practiced on non-conscientious individuals, such as 
children, until they are old enough to be able to reach an autonomous decision. Such practices 
should also not be required of a person following a tragic event. Segregation should be perceived 
within limits only if it doesn't include the aforementioned violations, or if its main purpose is not 
a restriction of personal autonomy that doesn't allow for an adequate range of options for 
individuals; and also if the members of the community don't risk ostracism due to the 
community's refusal of value pluralism. And lastly practices should not reinforce gender 
inequality. 
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Chapter 4: On potential claims to self-government rights by national 
minorities and immigrant groups within Europe 
 
So far, I have tried to show in these past two chapters that a liberal democratic state has a 
legitimate claim to impose liberal norms on potential illiberal minorities, as well as the fact that 
these limits to toleration need to be adjusted by specific guiding principles. The last question that 
remains to be answered is how the state should respond to claims of such minorities in the 
matters of group-differentiated rights, and specifically to self-government claims; a question to 
which this entire chapter is devoted. The very nature of a democratic state depends on numbers, 
the organisation of masses behind a shared ideal. Each vote counts for one, signifying the 
principle of equality on which liberal states are built. But this equality may be more equal for 
some than for others, as the majority population in this type of a system has the advantage by 
default. One can then see how this very founding principle of democracies can be the downfall of 
minority cultures within multicultural societies. Coincidentally majority of the Western liberal 
democracies are either already multicultural, or are in the process of becoming multicultural, and 
as such an increasing number of cultures wishes to have their traditions and communities 
protected within this new environment. There is therefore a natural need for external protections 
within a liberal democracy due to its very nature. Both immigrant groups and national minorities 
are at a natural disadvantage within a democratic system, and as such there are occasions when 
their interests need to be protected against either simply being outvoted by the majority, or in 
other areas in which they may be underrepresented and may need an affirmative action. 
Immigration is a matter of both cultural assimilation and cultural preservation, and as such 
immigrants tend to strive to both assimilate into the majority culture as much as they try to 
preserve their culture of origin for their future generations.  
There are multiple ways of including new immigrant groups or national minorities, as well as 
their cultural practices within the majority culture. In his book 'On Toleration' Walzer 
differentiates between three models of modern minority inclusiveness, with the first model being 
democratic inclusiveness, second being separationism, and the third being a hybrid model to 
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which he refers as the 'postmodernist project 
66
. The model of democratic inclusiveness is quite 
straightforward in the sense of toleration via inclusion. In this case minorities are encouraged to 
participate in the democratic processes, as well as to consider themselves as parts of the majority 
as opposed to placing emphasis on differentiating from it. The second model is that of 
separationism, in the sense of a specific ethnic group's struggle for self-determination and 
decentralisation of state institutions. Both of these models present us with possible benefits, as 
well as negatives in matters of political stability. I referred to the third model, that of 
postmodernism as a hybrid model due to its different perception of assimilation and social unity. 
With this model Walzer is referring to the effect that the liberal notion of individualism has on 
immigrant communities, in the sense that ''(i)ndividuals escape from their parochial 
entanglements and mix freely with members of the majority, but they don't necessarily assimilate 
to a common identity'' 
67
.  This model is essentially a description of the melting pot theory of 
multiculturalism, in that it describes the effects of intercultural dialogues toward a new shared 
identity among the multicultural population, the road toward a polyvalent community. This 
model however refers to future, rather than to the present situation, and as such the differences 
between the perceived majorities and minorities still need to be communicated in the context of 
group-specific rights, as well as through continuous intercultural dialogues. 
In order to protect such cultural practices group-differentiated rights therefore need to be allowed 
in certain specific cases. Kymlicka identifies 3 different forms of group-specific rights: special 
representation rights, polyethnic rights and self-government rights 
68
. All these three types of 
group-differentiated rights have the potential to be used for the purposes of both internal 
restrictions and external protections, and as such can pose a risk in matters of illiberal cultures as 
well as those cultures which have separationist tendencies. Special representation rights are 
rights demanded by minorities which are underrepresented in the democratic processes of their 
respective country, and are also known as group representation rights. Polyethnic rights are 
essentially anti-discriminatory rights, in the sense that they are meant to protect the ethnic 
group's endeavors from being negatively affected by the simple fact of their ethnical background 
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and the traditions to which they subscribe, such as the wearing of special head scarves for 
religious purposes. Both these forms of rights can be claimed with the intention of promoting 
integration into the larger society, and both may function as a precursor towards claims for self-
government rights and its potential separationist outcomes. 
Self-government rights are best summarized by Kymlicka as typically taking ''the form of 
devolving political power to a political unit substantially controlled by the members of the 
national minority, and substantially corresponding to their historical homeland or territory'', 
while understood as a permanent measure. 
Some political philosophers are more open to the possibility of awarding minorities with self-
government rights than others. Kukathas' metaphor of the liberal archipelago essentially refers to 
a stratified society, with each of its parts having a natural claim for self-government rights, as 
long as the limits to toleration are upheld. Contemporary liberal states however may be anything 
but culturally neutral, as matters of language spoken, national anthems and symbols privilege 
cultural traditions specific to the majority population. Some minorities with a historical 
background within such a state be convinced that such favoritism may not be fully representative 
of their historical contribution to the wellbeing of the state as well. In such cases the claims to 
self-government rights may have the potential of improving social unity between the minority 
and the majority. But it can also have the opposite effect as well, depending specifically on the 
relations between the minority and majority in question. 
Many political philosophers see the possibility of immigrant groups, and not national minorities, 
attempting to obtain self-government rights as improbable, as immigrant groups tend to strive for 
rights related to the expression of their ethnicity and differences, rather than demanding any type 
of sovereignty. And in the hypothetical case that such a claim would be made, most philosophers 
dismiss it on the basis of the immigrants' motivation to settle in the area. This sentiment can also 
be seen in the words of Walzer, who states that: ''they don't arrive in organized groups. They are 
not colonists, ... They cluster for comfort... Hence no sort of territorial autonomy is possible'' 
69
. 
However, the case of national minorities is largely different, as I will attempt to show now. 
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4.1 Evaluation of the claims to self-government rights 
 
I have previously noted that there is a difference between immigrant groups and national 
minorities as they exist in the United States of America and Canada, and as they exist in Europe. 
How exactly are they different? Consider the example of the Hungarian national minorities in the 
countries of Slovakia and Romania. This national minority poses a difficulty for Kymlicka's 
differentiation between an immigrant society and national minority, as Kymlicka's examples of 
national minorities eligible for self-government rights rest on examples of either colonists or 
indigenous cultures
70
, with neither of these categories being applicable to the national minorities 
currently located within Europe. The ancestors of the Hungarian national minorities have settled 
in the area of their surrounding countries over the course of many centuries, in main part due to 
these countries once collectively belonging to the Austro-Hungarian empire. Should then such 
national minorities be considered in advantage to immigrant groups, in the sense as perceived by 
Kymlicka?  
The following factors need to be considered. The national minorities relevant to Western Europe 
did not arrive in these European countries as colonists, although their relocation could be 
considered organised in the sense of the spread of the Hungarian culture through the Austro-
Hungarian empire from the 15th to 20th century. Their past relocation could also potentially be 
perceived as a wish to colonise, due to their ancestors' nationalist perspective on the Hungarian 
nationality and national identity, as evident by the assimilation process of Magyarization during 
the 18th to 20th century. Magyarization refers to a cultural assimilation strategy of the Kingdom 
of Hungary towards the other minorities of the Austro-Hungarian empire, during which the 
previous minorities, which now form the independent countries of Slovakia and Romania, were 
socially pressured into assimilating into the Hungarian culture. 
71
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The Hungarian national minorities presently strive for self-government rights in both of these 
countries. The claim of this national minority is however history-based rather than equality-
based. These minorities, however, possess both polyethnic rights, as well as special 
representation rights in both of the countries mentioned. They not only wish to be able to adopt 
Hungarian language as the official language in their region, a polyethnic right already granted, 
but also to separate existing public institutions from their Romanian counterparts.  
With a constantly increasing number of European countries belonging to the Schengen Area, this 
effectively means that national minorities, such as the Hungarian one, are able to move to the 
country they perceive as homeland without the limitation of borders. Should then claims for self-
governance be granted to such national minorities? I don't believe it would be an ideal decision 
in majority of the cases 
73
, but there are a few exceptions in which it could be the right solution, 
as I will attempt to show now.  
As one can imagine, granting self-government rights may pose multiple dangers, as well as it 
may provide multiple benefits, and it is on this balance between them that decisions on self-
government rights should be reached. Granting self-government rights may help in achieving 
social unity and political stability  within a society, just as well as it may affect them negatively. 
National identity may be perceived in different value by different minorities, largely affected by 
the majority's attempts at assimilating these minorities, and this perception of value in turn 
affects the potential outcome of granting such rights in terms of increasing or decreasing the 
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social unity of the population as a whole. While some claims to self-government rights may be 
motivated by an organised wish representative of relatively all members of that community, they 
could also be negatively affecting the social unity of the whole population.  
There are also other dangers associated with granting self-government rights. If a specific 
minority is granted such a privilege but others are not, it may lead to further minorities 
demanding the same treatment, or even manifestations of intolerance. It may also lead to 
potential conflicts within the newly formed political community, as not all members of the ethnic 
group may feel that separatism was an option that was necessary. This conflict of interests 
between a stratified community could in turn lead to new political representations which could 
damage the political stability of that community itself, with these conflicts further affecting the 
majority population once again. One can therefore see how granting self-government rights is a 
large risk, possibly to be granted only in already escalated situations. 
Self-government rights should be granted if, and only if, such a measure would lead to increased 
political stability, as well as increased social unity within the society as a whole. In this regard I 
believe I share my priority with Rawls, who stresses the importance of political stability both in 
social cooperation as well as in the role of toleration
74
. It is also for this reason that I believe the 
Hungarian minorities within other European states should not be granted the self-government 
rights as such a decision could lead to decreased social unity as it has before in the 1990s when 
the claims to self-government were first raised 
75
; in addition to the fact that their claims are 
history-based rather than equality-based, and the fact that their culture and practices are 
safeguarded by other group-differentiated rights. 
And as for any potential illiberal minorities, the same guiding principles should then apply for 
the evaluation of their potential claims to be granted self-government rights as well, provided 
that they meet the limits to toleration within the liberal state which I have discussed in the 
previous two chapters. 
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Conclusion 
 
The goal of this thesis was to establish a liberal treatment of illiberal minorities, with an 
emphasis on the treatment of said minorities within Western Europe. The treatment described 
was that of autonomy-based liberalism, with the justifications for the value of personal autonomy 
being derived mainly from the works of John Rawls and Joseph Raz, although they are both 
perceived to take a neutral stance toward the topic itself. 
In the second chapter of the thesis I have focused on justifying the imposition of liberal norms on 
illiberal minorities within the liberal state. This part of the thesis also introduced the two main 
claims that a minority may make, as described by Kymlicka, those of internal restrictions and 
external protections, which were then analysed in specific scenarios in the remaining two 
chapters. Large section of the second chapter of the thesis was devoted to the misconceived 
illiberality of the Romani minority, which in fact is typical only for its branches located within 
Eastern Europe due to the decreased or largely non-existent regulation from the side of the 
respective governments (as well as for other reasons mentioned), and as such cannot be taken to 
represent the culture of the entire minority itself. An important distinction in the liberal treatment 
of illiberal immigrant groups was also the role of free choice in respect to their immigration. 
Having justified potential imposition of liberal norms on illiberal minorities I have proceeded to 
argue that the existence of history and tradition should not be deemed as a condition for 
irrevisability, as toleration of certain illiberal practices may give their respective groups of origin 
specifically that idea, and for that reason not every conceivable difference or practice should be 
tolerated. A significant topic discussed within this chapter was that of value pluralism, and the 
need for its acknowledgement not only from the side of the liberal state, but also from the side of 
illiberal minorities. I have also noted the needed difference in approach towards domestic matters 
as opposed to international, based on the perceived value of autonomy in a liberal state as 
described by Raz. The limits of toleration were established based on the analysis of the various 
political philosophers' guiding principles, with a special emphasis placed on Parekh's summary 
of the main guiding principles present in most philosophers' work. In the conclusion of the 
chapter I have proposed 4 main guiding principles to establishing limits to toleration of illiberal 
cultures. I differentiated my conception of the no-harm principle from those of other thinkers to 
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practices involving irreversible harm of physical nature done without a reasonable consent. I 
argued for the universal value of gender equality, and the unacceptance of cultural practices that  
reinforce gender inequality. Lastly I have argued that segregation should only be tolerated if 
personal autonomy of the community members is guaranteed, together with the communities in 
question accepting value pluralism of its members as a means of protecting individuals from 
ostracism by their respective communities. 
Furthermore I have devoted the last section of the thesis to the question of group-differentiated 
rights, with an emphasis placed on the potential claims to self-government rights by both 
immigrant groups and national minorities relevant to Europe. As democracy has the potential to 
be the downfall of minority cultures, there is a natural need for external protections. The external 
protections are granted through group-differentiated rights, although they are a two-edged sword 
in the sense of possibly leading to inclusionism, as well as to separationism. These risks need to 
be evaluated on the basis of individual cases, although I have also established guiding principles 
for evaluating claims to self-government rights. Other forms of group-differentiated rights are 
also of importance to this evaluation, as evident in the example of the Hungarian minority's 
claims to self-government in Romania. An important criterion in the individual evaluations was 
also the differentiation between immigrant groups and national minorities, although to a different 
degree than presented by Canadian and American political philosophers, in most part due to the 
different types of national minorities being relevant to Europe. The guiding principles to 
evaluating the self-government claims were established as dependant on: whether granting such 
rights would increase political stability and social unity, whether the support for the claim was 
unanimous within the minority, and in the case of the claims being made by illiberal minorities 
also the acceptance of the suggested limits to toleration. 
For now the questions posed at the beginning of this thesis have been answered. I have provided 
a defence for autonomy-based liberalism treatment of illiberal minorities, as well as the guiding 
principles for the evaluation of claims to self-government rights, provided that their cultural 
practices meet the recognised limits to tolerance.  
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